Anyway, the Dalai Lama has been working on a new plan – 5/50 vision – that envisaged a five-year strategy for returning to dialogue with China, but preparing for a 50-year struggle if needed – along the “hope for the best and prepare for the worst” proverb. The 5/50 strategy reaffirmed his middle way approach (Umaylam) as a realistic political means to realise the dual aim of his early return to Tibet and fulfilling the aspirations of Tibetan people.
Appointing personal emissaries satisfies China. Beijing has been emphatically asking Dalai Lama to stop travelling to Western capitals, if talks are to be resumed. At the 19th party congress, the Tibet Work Forum chief told reporters that international figures have no excuse for meeting with the Dalai Lama. Recently, the Dalai Lama even had to abort his planned visit to Botswana, citing physical “exhaustion”.
In a rapidly-unfolding development, the Dalai Lama may have sent his envoy Samdong on a discreet visit to Kunming (China). Samdong’s visit, starting from mid November, must have been facilitated by no less than You Quan – newly-appointed head of the United Front Work Department that overseas Tibetan affairs. Quan, who formerly served as party secretary of Fujian, is a close associate of President Xi. He had earlier successfully dealt with Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan’s business communities.
Clearly, Samdong going to China forms part of the first five-year plan to engage with China, while Lobsang Sangay’s 17-day tour to Europe and Canada is meant to sustain the struggle for next 50 year, if the first plan fails.
Will the talks succeed now? In the past, Chinese leaders stymied the Dalai Lama’s desire to return to Tibet. But there is a distinct possibility that it may bear fruition this time.
First, Xi, widely known to have a soft spot for Tibet, hitherto kept it close to his chest, fearing resistance from hardliners. Unlike others, he held the view that prospects for solving the Tibet problem would peter out once the Dalai Lama is no more. Xi now finds himself in a perfect position to resolve the issue as no other Chinese leader could do, for he also stands to gain personally both in political and moral terms, to become the most credible leader in China’s history.
Second, the Dalai Lama too long hoped for Xi to change tack, as he hailed him as a “realist” and “open-minded” in contrast to his predecessors. In fact, the Tibetan leader has admitted to having received positive signals from top Chinese officials, especially from the moderate elements as streams of Han Chinese flocked out to meet him during Xi’s first term. In May this year, the party was shocked to find their own party members clandestinely funding the Dalai Lama.
But, most critically, Tibetans living inside Tibet may have pressurised the Dalai Lama to seize the opportunity and resolve differences during Xi’s second term, before the window for a deal closes a few years from now.
With time running out fast, the Dalai Lama can be anything but hopeful. He has been steadily losing his international support in the face of China’s rise as a world power. No longer does any country dare to receive the Dalai Lama officially.
Apart from his own ageing, the Tibetan leader faces the challenge of keeping his flock together. For example, the delay in reaching a solution causes anxiety, uncertainty and division among his people. Even inside Tibet, rising frustration and hopelessness have been highlighted by people resorting to self-immolation. The number stands at 149 so far.
And so, in what must be an embarrassing climb-down for the Tibetans, all they can do now is settle for the cause of “development”, besides hoping that the Chinese will not resort to the repression of Tibetan people.
Therefore, in a way, we are likely witness the curtains finally being drawn on Tibet’s quest for an independent state. Tim Johnson new this when he aptly titled his book Tragedy in Crimson: How the Dalai Lama Conquered the World but Lost the Battle with China.
And finally, for India, the question is whether New Delhi has any role to play in this rapidly-evolving scene, and if so under what political parameters. There is no sign of anyone having even considered the impact of this. But to be cautious, any Sino-Tibetan deal would seriously risk undercutting India’s position on the boundary dispute with China.
Seemingly fretful about impending developments, the Dalai Lama now finds himself walking a political tightrope by espousing reconciliation between India and China, “living peacefully by putting the differences aside”. He maintained a hands-off position and tried not to get drawn even into the Doklam standoff – instead he called for a peaceful solution. One hopes he is successful this time.
P. Stobdan, a former Indian ambassador, specialises in Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian and Uighur affairs.
image : Le drapeau national chinois est levé lors d’une cérémonie marquant le 96e anniversaire de la fondation du Parti communiste chinois (PCC) au Palais du Potala à Lhassa, Région autonome du Tibet, Chine, 1er juillet 2017. CNS / He Penglei via REUTERS / Files